To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.: 致$伯克希爾-哈撒韋B(BRK.B)$ 股東:

 Charlie Munger, my long-time partner, and I have the job of managing the savings of a  great number of individuals. We are grateful for their enduring trust, a relationship that often spans much of their adult lifetime. It is those dedicated savers that are forefront in my mind as I write this letter.

查理·芒格是我的長期合作伙伴,，我和他的工作是管理很多人的儲蓄,。我們感謝他們持久的信任,，這種關系往往貫穿他們成年后的大部分時間。在我寫這封信的時候,，我首先想到的就是那些熱心的儲蓄者,。

 A common belief is that people choose to save when young, expecting thereby to maintain their living standards after retirement. Any assets that remain at death, this theory says, will usually be left to their families or, possibly, to friends and philanthropy.

一種普遍的看法是，人們選擇在年輕時存錢,，希望以此來維持退休后的生活水平,。這一理論認為，死者死后留下的任何資產通常會留給家人,，也有可能留給朋友和慈善機構,。

 Our experience has differed. We believe Berkshire’s individual holders largely to be of the once-a-saver, always-a-saver variety. Though these people live well, they eventually dispense most of their funds to philanthropic organizations. These, in turn, redistribute the funds by expenditures intended to improve the lives of a great many people who are unrelated to the original benefactor. Sometimes, the results have been spectacular.

我們的經歷有所不同。我們認為,，伯克希爾的個人股東基本上屬于“一次儲蓄,，永遠儲蓄”的類型。雖然這些人生活得很好,，但他們最終會把大部分資金捐給慈善機構,。反過來，這些資金又通過旨在改善與原來的捐助者無關的許多人的生活的支出進行重新分配,。有時,，結果是驚人的。

 The disposition of money unmasks humans. Charlie and I watch with pleasure the vast flow of Berkshire-generated funds to public needs and, alongside, the infrequency with which our shareholders opt for look-at-me assets and dynasty-building.

金錢的處置揭示了人的本質,。查理和我高興地看著伯克希爾產生的大量資金流向公共需求,，同時，我們的股東很少選擇“瞧我多有錢”資產和家族王朝建設,。

 Who wouldn’t enjoy working for shareholders like ours? 誰不喜歡為我們這樣的股東工作呢?

【What We Do 我們做什么】

 Charlie and I allocate your savings at Berkshire between two related forms of ownership. First, we invest in businesses that we control, usually buying 100% of each. Berkshire directs capital allocation at these subsidiaries and selects the CEOs who make day-by-day operating decisions. When large enterprises are being managed, both trust and rules are essential. Berkshire emphasizes the former to an unusual – some would say extreme – degree. Disappointments are inevitable. We are understanding about business mistakes; our tolerance for personal misconduct is zero.

查理和我把你們在伯克希爾的存款分配給兩種相關的所有權形式,。首先，我們投資于我們控制的企業(yè),，通常是100%的收購,。伯克希爾對這些子公司進行資本配置，并挑選出負責日常運營決策的首席執(zhí)行官,。在管理大型企業(yè)時,，信任和規(guī)則都是必不可少的。伯克希爾對前者的強調達到了一種不同尋常的——有些人會說是極端的程度,。失望在所難免,。我們理解商業(yè)錯誤;我們對個人不端行為的容忍度為零。

 In our second category of ownership, we buy publicly-traded stocks through which we passively own pieces of businesses. Holding these investments, we have no say in management.

在我們的第二類所有權中,，我們購買公開交易的股票,，通過這些股票我們被動地擁有企業(yè)的一部分。持有這些投資，我們在管理上沒有發(fā)言權,。

Our goal in both forms of ownership is to make meaningful investments in businesses with both long-lasting favorable economic characteristics and trustworthy managers. Please note particularly that we own publicly-traded stocks based on our expectations about their long-term business performance, not because we view them as vehicles for adroit purchases and sales. That point is crucial: Charlie and I are not stock-pickers; we are business-pickers.

我們兩種所有權形式的目標都是對具有長期良好經濟特征和值得信賴的管理者的企業(yè)進行有意義的投資,。請?zhí)貏e注意，我們持有公開交易的股票是基于我們對其長期業(yè)務表現的預期,，而不是因為我們將其視為靈活買賣的工具,。這一點很關鍵: 查理和我都不是選股者; 我們是生意人。

Over the years, I have made many mistakes. Consequently, our extensive collection of businesses currently consists of a few enterprises that have truly extraordinary economics, many that enjoy very good economic characteristics, and a large group that are marginal. Along the way, other businesses in which I have invested have died, their products unwanted by the public. Capitalism has two sides: The system creates an ever-growing pile of losers while concurrently delivering a gusher of improved goods and services. Schumpeter called this phenomenon “creative destruction.”

這些年來,，我犯了很多錯誤,。因此，我們目前廣泛收集的企業(yè)包括少數真正具有非凡經濟效益的企業(yè),，許多企業(yè)享有非常好的經濟特征,，還有一大群企業(yè)處于邊緣地位。在此過程中,，我投資的其他企業(yè)已經倒閉,，它們的產品不受公眾歡迎。資本主義有兩面性: 這一體系創(chuàng)造了越來越多的輸家,，同時提供了大量改善的商品和服務,。熊彼特稱這種現象為“創(chuàng)造性破壞”。

 One advantage of our publicly-traded segment is that – episodically – it becomes easy to  buy pieces of wonderful businesses at wonderful prices. It’s crucial to understand that stocks often trade at truly foolish prices, both high and low. “Efficient” markets exist only in textbooks. In truth, marketable stocks and bonds are baffling, their behavior usually understandable only in retrospect.

我們的可交易股票部門的一個優(yōu)勢是,，偶爾可以很容易地以極好的價格收購一些極好的企業(yè),。重要的是要明白，股票交易的價格往往非常愚蠢,，無論是高還是低,。“有效”市場只存在于教科書中,。事實上,，有市場的股票和債券令人困惑，它們的行為通常只有在回顧時才能理解,。

 Controlled businesses are a different breed. They sometimes command ridiculously higher prices than justified but are almost never available at bargain valuations. Unless under duress, the owner of a controlled business gives no thought to selling at a panic-type valuation.

受控企業(yè)則是另一種類型,。它們的價格有時高得離譜，但幾乎從來沒有便宜的估值,。除非受到脅迫,，控股企業(yè)的所有者不會考慮以恐慌性估值出售。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

At this point, a report card from me is appropriate: In 58 years of Berkshire management, most of my capital-allocation decisions have been no better than so-so. In some cases, also, bad moves by me have been rescued by very large doses of luck. (Remember our escapes from near-disasters at USAir and Salomon? I certainly do.)

在限制這一個時點,，展示一下我的成績單是合適的: 在伯克希爾58年的管理中,，我的大部分資本配置決策都不怎么樣。此外,，在某些情況下,，我的壞棋也會被大量的運氣所挽救,。(還記得我們從美國航空公司(USAir)和所羅門(Salomon)的險些災難中逃生嗎? 我當然記得。)

 Our satisfactory results have been the product of about a dozen truly good decisions – that would be about one every five years – and a sometimes-forgotten advantage that favors long-term investors such as Berkshire. Let’s take a peek behind the curtain.

我們令人滿意的業(yè)績來自于十幾個真正好的決策——大約每五年一個決策——以及一個有時被遺忘的優(yōu)勢,，這個優(yōu)勢有利于伯克希爾這樣的長期投資者。讓我們看一看幕后,。

【The Secret Sauce 秘密武器】

In August 1994 – yes, 1994 – Berkshire completed its seven-year purchase of the 400  million shares of Coca-Cola we now own. The total cost was $1.3 billion – then a very meaningful sum at Berkshire.

1994年8月——是的,，1994年——伯克希爾完成了對我們現在持有的4億股可口可樂的7年收購?？偝杀緸?3億美元——當時對伯克希爾來說是一筆非常有意義的數目,。

 The cash dividend we received from Coke in 1994 was $75 million. By 2022, the dividend had increased to $704 million. Growth occurred every year, just as certain as birthdays. All Charlie and I were required to do was cash Coke’s quarterly dividend checks. We expect that those checks are highly likely to grow.

1994年我們從可口可樂公司獲得的現金分紅是7500萬美元。到2022年,，股息增加到7.04億美元,。成長每年都在發(fā)生，就像生日一樣確定無疑,。查理和我只需要兌現可口可樂的季度股息支票就可以了,。我們預計這些支票很可能會增加。

American Express is much the same story. Berkshire’s purchases of Amex were essentially completed in 1995 and, coincidentally, also cost $1.3 billion. Annual dividends received from this investment have grown from $41 million to $302 million. Those checks, too, seem highly likely to increase.

美國運通(American Express)的情況大致相同,。伯克希爾對美國運通的收購基本上在1995年完成，巧合的是，也花費了13億美元,。從這項投資中獲得的年度股息從4100萬美元增長到3.02億美元,。這些支票似乎也極有可能增加。

 These dividend gains, though pleasing, are far from spectacular. But they bring with them important gains in stock prices. At yearend, our Coke investment was valued at $25 billion while Amex was recorded at $22 billion. Each holding now accounts for roughly 5% of Berkshire’s net worth, akin to its weighting long ago.

這些股息收益雖然令人滿意,，但遠談不上驚人,。但它們也帶來了股票價格的重要上漲。在年底,，我們對可口可樂的投資價值250億美元,，而美國運通的價值為220億美元。目前每份持股約占伯克希爾凈資產的5%,，與很久以前的權重相當,。

 Assume, for a moment, I had made a similarly-sized investment mistake in the 1990s, one that flat-lined and simply retained its $1.3 billion value in 2022. (An example would be a high-grade 30-year bond.) That disappointing investment would now represent an insignificant 0.3% of Berkshire’s net worth and would be delivering to us an unchanged $80 million or so of annual income.

假設我在上世紀90年代犯了一個類似規(guī)模的投資錯誤，在2022年保持了13億美元的價值,。(比如30年期高等級債券),。這筆令人失望的投資現在只會占伯克希爾凈資產的微不足道的0.3%，并將為我們帶來8000萬美元左右不變的年收入,。

 The lesson for investors: The weeds wither away in significance  as the flowers bloom.  Over time, it takes just a few winners to work wonders. And, yes, it helps to start early and live into your 90s as well.

給投資者的教訓是: 花開花落,，雜草只會枯萎。隨著時間的推移,，只需要幾個贏家就能創(chuàng)造奇跡,。而且,，是的，早點開始投資,、活到90多歲也有幫助,。

【The Past Year in Brief 過去一年簡要介紹】

 Berkshire had a good year in 2022. The company’s operating earnings – our term for income calculated using Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), exclusive of capital gains or losses from equity holdings – set a record at $30.8 billion. Charlie and I focus on this operational figure and urge you to do so as well. The GAAP figure, absent our adjustment, fluctuates wildly and capriciously at every reporting date. Note its acrobatic behavior in 2022, which is in no way unusual:

伯克希爾在2022年業(yè)績不錯。該公司的營業(yè)利潤 (我們定義為使用公認會計原則(“GAAP”)計算的收入,，但是不包括股權持有的資本收益或損失) 創(chuàng)下308億美元的記錄,。查理和我專注于這個實際數字，并敦促你也這樣做,。美國公認會計準則(GAAP)數據,，如果沒有我們的調整，在每個報告日都會劇烈波動,。請注意它在2022年的雜技行為,，這并不罕見:

The GAAP earnings are 100% misleading when viewed quarterly or even annually. Capital gains, to be sure, have been hugely important to Berkshire over past decades, and we expect them to be meaningfully positive in future decades. But their quarter-by-quarter gyrations, regularly and mindlessly headlined by media, totally misinform investors.

從季度甚至年度來看，美國公認會計準則的收益是100%具有誤導性的,?？梢钥隙ǖ氖牵谶^去幾十年里,，資本利得對伯克希爾來說非常重要,，我們預計在未來幾十年里，資本利得將顯著增加,。但它們的季度環(huán)比波動——經常被媒體盲目報道——完全誤導了投資者,。

A second positive development for Berkshire last year was our purchase of Alleghany Corporation, a property-casualty insurer captained by Joe Brandon. I’ve worked with Joe in the past, and he  understands both Berkshire  and insurance. Alleghany delivers special value to us because Berkshire’s unmatched financial strength allows its insurance subsidiaries to follow valuable and enduring investment strategies unavailable to virtually all competitors.

伯克希爾去年的第二個積極進展是我們收購了由喬·布蘭登(Joe Brandon)擔任董事長的財產意外保險公司Alleghany Corporation。我過去曾與喬共事,，他對伯克希爾和保險都很了解,。Alleghany 對我們來說具有特殊的價值，因為伯克希爾無與倫比的財務實力使其保險子公司能夠遵循幾乎所有競爭對手都無法遵循的有價值和持久的投資策略,。

 Aided by Alleghany, our insurance float increased during 2022 from $147 billion to $164 billion. With disciplined underwriting, these funds have a decent chance of being cost-free over time. Since purchasing our first property-casualty insurer in 1967, Berkshire’s float has increased 8,000-fold through acquisitions, operations and innovations. Though not recognized in our financial statements, this float has been an extraordinary asset for Berkshire. New shareholders can get an understanding of its value by reading our annually updated explanation of float on page A-2.

在Alleghany的幫助下,，我們的保險浮存金在2022年從1470億美元增加到1640億美元。通過嚴格的承銷,，隨著時間的推移,，這些資金有相當大的機會實現零成本。自1967年收購第一家財產意外險公司以來,，通過收購,、運營和創(chuàng)新，伯克希爾的浮存金增長了8,000倍,。雖然在我們的財務報表中沒有得到確認,，但這筆浮存金對伯克希爾來說是一筆非凡的資產。新股東可以通過閱讀A-2頁我們每年更新的浮存金解釋來了解其價值,。

 * * * * * * * * * * * *

A very minor gain in per-share intrinsic value took place in 2022 through Berkshire share repurchases as well as similar moves at Apple and American Express, both significant investees of ours. At Berkshire, we directly increased your interest in our unique collection of businesses by repurchasing 1.2% of the company’s outstanding shares. At Apple and Amex, repurchases increased Berkshire’s ownership a bit without any cost to us.

2022年,，通過伯克希爾股票回購以及$蘋果(AAPL)$ 和美國運通的類似舉措,，我們的每股內在價值獲得了非常小的增長，這兩家公司都是我們的重要投資對象,。在伯克希爾,，我們通過回購1.2%的公司流通股，直接增加了您對我們獨特業(yè)務組合的興趣,。在蘋果和美國運通,，回購增加了伯克希爾的持股比例，而我們沒有付出任何代價,。

 The math isn’t complicated: When the share count goes down, your interest in our many businesses goes up. Every small bit helps if repurchases are made at value-accretive prices. Just as surely, when a company overpays for repurchases, the continuing shareholders lose. At such times, gains flow only to the selling shareholders and to the friendly, but expensive, investment banker who recommended the foolish purchases.

計算并不復雜: 當股份數量下降時，你在我們許多業(yè)務上的權益比例就會上升,。如果回購以增值的價格進行,，那么每一點都有幫助。同樣可以肯定的是,，當一家公司支付過多的回購費用時,，持續(xù)持有股票的股東就會蒙受損失。在這種時候,，收益只會流向拋售股票的股東,，以及那些友好但昂貴的投資銀行家，他們推薦了愚蠢的購買,。

 Gains from value-accretive repurchases, it should be emphasized, benefit all owners – in every respect. Imagine, if you will, three fully-informed shareholders of a local auto dealership, one of whom manages the business. Imagine, further, that one of the passive owners wishes to sell his interest back to the company at a price attractive to the two continuing shareholders. When completed, has this transaction harmed anyone? Is the manager somehow favored over the continuing passive owners? Has the public been hurt?

應該強調的是,，增值回購帶來的收益在各個方面都有利于所有所有者。想象一下,，如果你愿意,，當地一家汽車經銷商的三個完全知情的股東，其中一人管理著該業(yè)務,。再進一步想象一下,，其中一個被動股東希望以對兩個持續(xù)股東有吸引力的價格將自己的權益賣回給公司。交易完成后,，是否對任何人造成了傷害? 那個管理者是否比那個持續(xù)持有的被動股東更受益?公眾受到傷害了嗎?

 When you are told that all repurchases are harmful to shareholders or to the country, or particularly beneficial to CEOs, you are listening to either an economic illiterate or a silver-tongued demagogue (characters that are not mutually exclusive).

當有人告訴你,，所有的回購行為都對股東或國家有害，或者對首席執(zhí)行官特別有利時,，你要么是在聽一個經濟文盲說話,，要么是在聽一個能言善辯的煽動家說話 (這兩個角色并不相互排斥)。

Almost endless details of Berkshire’s 2022 operations are laid out on pages K-33 – K-66. Charlie and I, along with many Berkshire shareholders, enjoy poring over the many facts and figures laid out in that section. These pages are not, however, required reading. There are many Berkshire centimillionaires and, yes, billionaires who have never studied our financial figures. They simply know that Charlie and I – along with our families and close friends – continue to have very significant investments in Berkshire, and they trust us to treat their money as we do our own.

伯克希爾2022年的運營細節(jié)幾乎無窮無盡地列在K-33 - K-66頁上,。查理和我,，以及伯克希爾的許多股東，都喜歡仔細研究這部分列出的許多事實和數據,。然而,，這幾頁不是必讀的,。伯克希爾有很多百萬富翁，是的,，億萬富翁,，他們從來沒有研究過我們的財務數據。他們只是知道查理和我——以及我們的家人和親密的朋友——繼續(xù)在伯克希爾有非常重要的投資,，他們相信我們會像對待自己的錢一樣對待他們的錢,。

And that is a promise we can make. 這是我們可以做出的承諾。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Finally, an important warning: Even the operating earnings figure that we favor can easily be manipulated by managers who wish to do so. Such tampering is often thought of as sophisticated by CEOs, directors and their advisors. Reporters and analysts embrace its existence as well. Beating “expectations” is heralded as a managerial triumph.

最后,，一個重要的警告: 即使是我們喜歡看的營業(yè)利潤數據,，也很容易被希望這樣做的經理操縱。首席執(zhí)行官,、董事和他們的顧問通常認為這種篡改行為很老練,。記者和分析人士也欣然接受它的存在。超“預期”利潤被視為管理的勝利,。

 That activity is disgusting. It requires no talent to manipulate numbers: Only a deep desire  to deceive is required. “Bold imaginative accounting,” as a CEO once described his deception to me, has become one of the shames of capitalism.

那種活動真惡心,。操縱數字不需要天賦，只需要欺騙的強烈欲望,。一位首席執(zhí)行官曾對我說,，“大膽而富有想象力的會計”已經成為資本主義的恥辱之一。

58 Years – and a Few Figures 58年——和幾個數字

In 1965, Berkshire was a one-trick pony, the owner of a venerable – but doomed – New England textile operation. With that business on a death march, Berkshire needed an immediate fresh start. Looking back, I was slow to recognize the severity of its problems.

1965年,，伯克希爾還是只會一招的小馬,，擁有一家歷史悠久但注定要失敗的新英格蘭紡織企業(yè)。由于該業(yè)務正處于死亡行軍中,，伯克希爾需要立即有個新的開始,。回首往事,，我遲遲才意識到問題的嚴重性,。

 And then came a stroke of good luck: National Indemnity became available in 1967, and we shifted our resources toward insurance and other non-textile operations.

然后，幸運的是:1967年,，有了收購國民保險公司的機會,，于是我們將資源轉移到保險和其他非紡織業(yè)務上。

 Thus began our journey to 2023, a bumpy road involving a combination of continuous savings by our owners (that is, by their retaining earnings), the power of compounding, our avoidance of major mistakes and – most important of all – the American Tailwind. America would have done fine without Berkshire. The reverse is not true.

就這樣,，我們開始了通往2023年的旅程,，這是一條坎坷的道路，涉及了我們股東( 通過他們的留存利潤)的持續(xù)儲蓄,、復利的力量,、我們的避免重大錯誤，以及最重要的——美國順風,。沒有伯克希爾,，美國也能做得很好,。反之則不然。

 Berkshire now enjoys major ownership in an unmatched collection of huge and diversified businesses. Let’s first look at the 5,000 or so publicly-held companies that trade daily on NASDAQ, the NYSE and related venues. Within this group is housed the members of the S&P 500 Index, an elite collection of large and well-known American companies.

伯克希爾現在擁有無與倫比的龐大而多樣化的業(yè)務,。讓我們先來看看每天在納斯達克(NASDAQ),、紐約證交所(NYSE)及相關市場交易的約5000家上市公司。標準普爾500指數(S&P 500 Index)的成份股都在這個群體中,，這是一個由大型知名美國公司組成的精英群體,。

 In aggregate, the 500 earned $1.8 trillion in 2021. I don’t yet have the final results for 2022. Using, therefore, the 2021 figures, only 128 of the 500 (including Berkshire itself) earned $3 billion or more. Indeed, 23 lost money.

這500強企業(yè)在2021年的總收入為1.8萬億美元。我還沒有2022年的最終結果,。因此,，使用2021年的數據，500強中只有128家(包括伯克希爾本身)的收入在30億美元或以上,。確實,，23家還賠錢了。

At yearend 2022, Berkshire was the largest owner of eight of these giants: American Express, Bank of America, Chevron, Coca-Cola, HP Inc., Moody’s, Occidental Petroleum and Paramount Global.

截至2022年底,，伯克希爾是其中八家巨頭的最大股東:美國運通、美國銀行,、雪佛龍,、可口可樂、惠普公司,、穆迪,、西方石油公司和派拉蒙全球。

In addition to those eight investees, Berkshire owns 100% of BNSF and 92%  of  BH Energy, each with earnings that exceed the $3 billion mark noted above ($5.9 billion at BNSF and $4.3 billion at BHE).   Were these companies publicly-owned, they would replace two present members of the 500.   

除了這八家被投資方,，伯克希爾還擁有BNSF鐵路 100%的股權和伯克希爾電力（BHE）92%的股權,，每家公司的收益都超過了上文提到的30億美元大關(BNSF 59億美元，BHE 43億美元),。如果這些公司是上市公司,，它們將取代目前500強中的兩家公司。

All told, our ten controlled and non-controlled behemoths leave Berkshire more broadly aligned with the country’s economic future than is the case at any other U.S. company.   (This calculation leaves aside “fiduciary” operations such as pension funds and investment companies.)   In addition, Berkshire’s insurance operation, though conducted through many individually-managed subsidiaries, has a value comparable to BNSF or BHE.

總的來說,，我們的十家控股和非控股巨頭使伯克希爾比任何其他美國公司都更廣泛地與國家的經濟未來保持一致,。(這一計算沒有考慮養(yǎng)老基金和投資公司等“信托”業(yè)務。) 此外,，伯克希爾的保險業(yè)務雖然通過許多獨立管理的子公司進行,，但其價值與BNSF或BHE相當。

As for the future, Berkshire will always hold a boatload of cash and U.S. Treasury bills along with a wide array of businesses. We will also avoid behavior that could result in any uncomfortable cash needs at inconvenient times, including financial panics and unprecedented insurance losses. Our CEO will always be the Chief Risk Officer – a task it is irresponsible to delegate. Additionally, our future CEOs will have a significant part of their net worth in Berkshire shares, bought with their own money. And yes, our shareholders will continue to save and prosper by retaining earnings.

至于未來,，伯克希爾將始終持有大量現金和美國國債,，以及廣泛的業(yè)務。我們還將避免在不方便的時候導致不舒服的現金需求的行為,，包括在金融恐慌和前所未有的保險損失時,。我們的首席執(zhí)行官將永遠是首席風險官——將這項任務委派他人是不負責任的,。此外，我們未來的首席執(zhí)行官將用他們自己的錢購買伯克希爾的股票,，這將是他們凈資產的很大一部分,。是的，我們的股東將繼續(xù)通過公司留存利潤來儲蓄和興隆昌盛,。

 At Berkshire, there will be no finish line. 在伯克希爾,，沒有終點線。

【Some Surprising Facts About Federal Taxes 關于聯邦稅收的一些令人驚訝的事實】

During the decade ending in 2021, the United States Treasury received about $32.3 trillion in taxes while it spent $43.9 trillion.

在截至2021年的10年里,，美國財政部的稅收收入約為32.3萬億美元,，而支出為43.9萬億美元。

 Though economists, politicians and many of the public have opinions about the consequences of that huge imbalance, Charlie and I plead ignorance and firmly believe that near-term economic and market forecasts are worse than useless. Our job is to manage Berkshire’s operations and finances in a manner that will achieve an acceptable result over time and that will preserve the company’s unmatched staying power when financial panics or severe worldwide recessions occur. Berkshire also offers some modest protection from runaway inflation, but this attribute is far from perfect. Huge and entrenched fiscal deficits have consequences.

盡管經濟學家,、政治家和許多公眾都對這種巨大失衡的后果有自己的看法,，但查理和我以無知為借口，堅信短期的經濟和市場預測并非一無是處,。我們的工作是管理伯克希爾的運營和財務,，以一種隨著時間的推移將取得可接受的結果的方式，在金融恐慌或嚴重的全球衰退發(fā)生時保持公司無與倫比的持久力,。伯克希爾也為通脹失控提供了一定程度的保護,，但這一點還遠遠不夠完美。巨額且根深蒂固的財政赤字是有后果的,。

 The $32 trillion of revenue was garnered by the Treasury through individual income taxes (48%), social security and related receipts (341¤2%), corporate income tax payments (81¤2%) and a wide variety of lesser levies. Berkshire’s contribution via the corporate income tax was $32 billion during the decade, almost exactly a tenth of 1% of all money that the Treasury collected.

32萬億美元的財政收入是由財政部通過個人所得稅(48%),、社會保障和相關收入(34.5%)、企業(yè)所得稅(8.5%)和各種各樣的小額稅收獲得的,。在這十年中,，伯克希爾通過企業(yè)所得稅貢獻了320億美元，幾乎正好是財政部稅收總額千分之一

And that means – brace yourself – had there been roughly 1,000 taxpayers in the U.S. matching Berkshire’s payments, no other businesses nor any of the country’s 131 million households would have needed to pay any taxes to the federal government. Not a dime.

這意味著——請做好準備——如果美國有大約1000名納稅人也支付伯克希爾那么多的稅款,，那么就沒有其他企業(yè)或美國1.31億家庭需要向聯邦政府繳納任何稅款,。一分錢也不用。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Millions, billions, trillions – we all know the words, but the sums involved are almost impossible to comprehend. Let’s put physical dimensions to the numbers:

數百萬,、數十億,、數萬億——我們都知道這些詞，但其中涉及的金額幾乎無法理解,。讓我們用物理維度來表示這些數字:

 ·     If you convert $1 million into newly-printed $100 bills, you will have a stack that reaches your chest.

· 如果你把100萬美元兌換成新印的100美元,，你會有一疊堆到你胸口的鈔票。

·     Perform the same exercise with $1 billion – this is getting exciting! – and the stack reaches about 3¤4 of a mile into the sky.

· 用10億美元做同樣的練習——這越來越令人興奮了! - 這堆錢達到了大約四分之三英里的高度,。

·     Finally, imagine piling up $32 billion, the total of Berkshire’s 2012-21 federal income tax payments. Now the stack grows to more than 21 miles in height, about three times the level at which commercial airplanes usually cruise.

· 最后,，想象一下伯克希爾2012-21年度聯邦所得稅支付總額達到320億美元。現在，這堆錢的高度已經超過了21英里,，大約是商用飛機通常巡航高度的三倍,。

 When it comes to federal taxes, individuals who own Berkshire can unequivocally state “I gave at the office.” 當涉及到聯邦稅收時，擁有伯克希爾的個人可以明確地說“我已經在辦公室交過了”,。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

At Berkshire we hope and expect to pay much more in taxes during the next decade. We owe the country no less: America’s dynamism has made a huge contribution to whatever success Berkshire has achieved – a contribution Berkshire will always need. We count on the American Tailwind and, though it has been becalmed from time to time, its propelling force has always returned.

在伯克希爾,，我們希望并期望在未來十年繳納更多的稅款。我們同樣虧欠這個國家:美國的活力對伯克希爾取得的任何成功都做出了巨大貢獻——伯克希爾永遠都需要這種貢獻,。我們依靠的是美國順風,，雖然它有時會停滯不前，但它的推動力總是回來的,。

 I have been investing for 80 years – more than one-third of our country’s lifetime. Despite our citizens’ penchant – almost enthusiasm – for self-criticism and self-doubt, I have yet to see a time when it made sense to make a long-term bet against America. And I doubt very much that any reader of this letter will have a different experience in the future.

我從事投資已經80年了,，超過了我國歷史的三分之一。盡管我們的公民有自我批評和自我懷疑的傾向——甚至可以說是熱情——但我還沒有看到有什么時候有理由長期做空美國,。我非常懷疑這封信的讀者將來會有不同的體驗,。

【Nothing Beats Having a Great Partner 沒有什么比擁有一個好伴侶更好的了】

Charlie and I think pretty much alike. But what it takes me a page to explain, he sums up in a sentence. His version,  moreover,  is  always  more  clearly  reasoned  and  also  more  artfully – some might add bluntly – stated.

查理和我想法很相似。但我花了一頁紙解釋的東西,，他可以用一句話總結出來,。此外，他的版本總是更清楚地推理,，也更巧妙地——有些人可能會說——更直言不諱,。

 Here are a few of his thoughts, many lifted from a very recent podcast:

以下是他的一些想法，很多摘自最近的播客:

 ·     The world is full of foolish gamblers, and they will not do as well as the patient investor.

· 世界上到處都是愚蠢的賭徒,，他們不會比耐心的投資者更成功。

·     If you don’t see the world the way it is, it’s like judging something through a distorted lens.

· 如果你不接受世界的現實情況,，那就像是通過扭曲的鏡頭來判斷事物,。

·     All I want to know is where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there. And a related thought: Early on, write your desired obituary – and then behave accordingly.

· 我只想知道我將死在哪里，這樣我就永遠不會去那里,。還有一個相關的想法: 在早期,，寫下你想要的訃告——然后相應地行動。

·     If you don’t care whether you are rational or not, you won’t work on it. Then you will stay irrational and get lousy results.

· 如果你不在乎自己是否理性,，你就不會努力,。這樣你就會變得不理智，結果會很糟糕,。

·     Patience can be learned. Having a long attention span and the ability to concentrate on one thing for a long time is a huge advantage.

· 耐心是可以學會的,。注意力持續(xù)時間長，能夠長時間專注于一件事是一個巨大的優(yōu)勢,。

·     You can learn a lot from dead people. Read of the deceased you admire and detest.

· 你可以從死人身上學到很多東西,。閱讀一下關于你欽佩或者厭惡的死者。

· Don’t bail away in a sinking boat if you can swim to one that is seaworthy.

·如果你能游到一艘適航的船,，就不要繼續(xù)在下沉的船上勺水,。

· A great company keeps working after you are not; a mediocre company won’t do that.

· 一家偉大的公司會在你退休后繼續(xù)運轉;一個平庸的公司不會這么做,。

·     Warren and I don’t focus on the froth of the market. We seek out good long-term investments and stubbornly hold them for a long time.

· 沃倫和我不關注市場的泡沫。我們尋找好的長期投資,，并頑固地長期持有,。

·     Ben Graham said, “Day to day, the stock market is a voting machine;  in the long term it’s   a weighing machine.” If you keep making something more valuable, then some wise person is going to notice it and start buying.

· 本·格雷厄姆(Ben Graham)說過: “日復一日，股市都是一臺投票機; 從長遠來看,，它就是一臺稱重機,。” 如果你不斷創(chuàng)造更有價值的東西,，那么一些明智的人就會注意到它,，并開始購買。

·     There is no such thing as a 100% sure thing when investing. Thus, the use of leverage is dangerous. A string of wonderful numbers times zero will always equal zero. Don’t count  on getting rich twice.

· 投資時沒有百分之百的把握,。因此,，使用杠桿是危險的。一串奇妙的數字乘以0總是等于0,。不要指望能富兩次,。

· You don’t, however, need to own a lot of things in order to get rich.

· 然而，你不需要為了致富而擁有很多東西,。

·     You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.

· 如果你想成為一名偉大的投資者,，你必須不斷學習。當世界發(fā)生變化,， 你必須改變,。

·     Warren and I hated railroad stocks for decades, but the world changed and finally the country had four huge railroads of vital importance to the American economy. We were slow to recognize the change, but better late than never.

· 沃倫和我討厭鐵路股有幾十年了，但世界變了,，最終美國有了四條對美國經濟至關重要的大型鐵路,。我們遲遲沒有意識到這種變化，但遲到總比不到好,。

·     Finally, I will add two short sentences by Charlie that have been his decision-clinchers for decades: “Warren, think more about it. You’re smart and I’m right.”

· 最后,，我要加上查理的兩句話，這兩句話幾十年來一直是他做決定的關鍵: “沃倫,，再考慮一下,。你很聰明，而我是對的,?！?/p>

And so it goes. I never have a phone call with Charlie without learning something. And, while he makes me think, he also makes me laugh.

就這樣。每次和查理通話,，我都會有所收獲,。而且，當他讓我思考時，他也讓我笑,。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

I  will  add  to  Charlie’s  list  a  rule  of  my  own:  Find   a   very   smart   high-grade partner – preferably slightly older than you – and then listen very carefully to what he says.

我將在查理的清單上加上我自己的一條規(guī)則:找一個非常聰明的高質量伙伴——最好比你稍年長一點——然后非常仔細地聽他說什么,。

【A Family Gathering in Omaha 奧馬哈的家庭聚會】

Charlie and I are shameless. Last year, at our first shareholder get-together in three years,  we greeted you with our usual commercial hustle.

查理和我真是不要臉。去年,，在我們三年來的第一次股東大會上,，我們一如既往地以繁忙的商業(yè)活動迎接大家。

 From the opening bell, we went straight for your wallet. In short order, our See’s kiosk   sold you eleven tons of nourishing peanut brittle and chocolates. In our P.T. Barnum pitch, we promised you longevity. After all, what else but candy from See’s could account for Charlie and me making it to 99 and 92?

從開市鈴一響,，我們就直奔你的錢包,。在短時間內，我們的喜詩小攤賣給你11噸有營養(yǎng)的花生糖和巧克力,。在我們的P.T.巴納姆演講中,，我們向你保證過長壽。畢竟,，除了喜詩的糖果,，還有什么能解釋查理和我能活到99年和92歲呢?

 I know you can’t wait to hear the specifics of last year’s hustle.

知道你迫不及待地想知道去年的工作細節(jié)。

 On Friday, the doors were open from noon until 5 p.m., and our candy counters rang up 2,690  individual sales. On Saturday, See’s registered an additional 3,931 transactions between 7 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., despite the fact that 61¤2 of the 91¤2 operating hours occurred while our movie and the question-and-answer session were limiting commercial traffic.

周五,，大門從中午一直開到下午5點,，我們的糖果柜臺共賣出了2690份。周六上午7點至下午4點半,，盡管在9.5小時的營業(yè)時間中,，有6.5小時因為電影放映和問答環(huán)節(jié)而限制商業(yè)人流量，喜詩新增了3931筆交易,。

Do the math: See’s rang up about 10 sales per minute during its prime operating time (racking up $400,309 of volume during the two days), with all the goods purchased at a single location selling products that haven’t been materially altered in 101 years. What worked for See’s in the days of Henry Ford’s model T works now.

算算看: 喜詩在其黃金營業(yè)時間內,，每分鐘約有10筆銷售(兩天內銷售額達400,309美元)，所有在同一地點購買的商品都是101年沒有實質性改變的產品,。在亨利·福特T型車時代對喜詩管用的方法現在也管用,。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Charlie, I, and the entire Berkshire  bunch  look  forward  to  seeing  you  in  Omaha  on  May 5-6. We will have a good time and so will you.

查理，我和整個伯克希爾公司都期待著5月5-6日在奧馬哈見到你,。我們會玩得很開心,，你也會,。

 February 25, 2023      Warren E. Buffett Chairman of the Board

2023年2月25日,，沃倫·E·巴菲特，董事會主席

$伯克希爾-哈撒韋A(BRK.A)$