Now, about 20 years ago, all that began to change. Neuroscientists like Francis Crick and physicists like Roger Penrose said now is the time for science to attack consciousness. And since then, there's been a real explosion, a flowering of scientific work on consciousness. And this work has been wonderful. It's been great. But it also has some fundamental limitations so far. The centerpiece of the science of consciousness in recent years has been the search for correlations, correlations between certain areas of the brain and certain states of consciousness. We saw some of this kind of work from Nancy Kanwisher and the wonderful work she presented just a few minutes ago. Now we understand much better, for example, the kinds of brain areas that go along with the conscious experience of seeing faces or of feeling pain or of feeling happy. But this is still a science of correlations. It's not a science of explanations. We know that these brain areas go along with certain kinds of conscious experience, but we don't know why they do. I like to put this by saying that this kind of work from neuroscience is answering some of the questions we want answered about consciousness, the questions about what certain brain areas do and what they correlate with. But in a certain sense, those are the easy problems. No knock on the neuroscientists. There are no truly easy problems with consciousness. But it doesn't address the real mystery at the core of this subject: why is it that all that physical processing in a brain should be accompanied by consciousness at all? Why is there this inner subjective movie? Right now, we don't really have a bead on that. And you might say, let's just give neuroscience a few years. It'll turn out to be another emergent phenomenon like traffic jams, like hurricanes, like life, and we'll figure it out. The classical cases of emergence are all cases of emergent behavior, how a traffic jam behaves, how a hurricane functions, how a living organism reproduces and adapts and metabolizes, all questions about objective functioning. You could apply that to the human brain in explaining some of the behaviors and the functions of the human brain as emergent phenomena: how we walk, how we talk, how we play chess, all these questions about behavior. But when it comes to consciousness, questions about behavior are among the easy problems. When it comes to the hard problem, that's the question of why is it that all this behavior is accompanied by subjective experience? And here, the standard paradigm of emergence, even the standard paradigms of neuroscience, don't really, so far, have that much to say. Now, I'm a scientific materialist at heart. I want a scientific theory of consciousness that works, and for a long time, I banged my head against the wall looking for a theory of consciousness in purely physical terms that would work. But I eventually came to the conclusion that that just didn't work for systematic reasons. It's a long story, but the core idea is just that what you get from purely reductionist explanations in physical terms, in brain-based terms, is stories about the functioning of a system, its structure, its dynamics, the behavior it produces, great for solving the easy problems — how we behave, how we function — but when it comes to subjective experience — why does all this feel like something from the inside? — that's something fundamentally new, and it's always a further question. So I think we're at a kind of impasse here. We've got this wonderful, great chain of explanation, we're used to it, where physics explains chemistry, chemistry explains biology, biology explains parts of psychology. But consciousness doesn't seem to fit into this picture. On the one hand, it's a datum that we're conscious. On the other hand, we don't know how to accommodate it into our scientific view of the world. So I think consciousness right now is a kind of anomaly, one that we need to integrate into our view of the world, but we don't yet see how. Faced with an anomaly like this, radical ideas may be needed, and I think that we may need one or two ideas that initially seem crazy before we can come to grips with consciousness scientifically. Now, there are a few candidates for what those crazy ideas might be. My friend Dan Dennett, who's here today, has one. His crazy idea is that there is no hard problem of consciousness. The whole idea of the inner subjective movie involves a kind of illusion or confusion. Actually, all we've got to do is explain the objective functions, the behaviors of the brain, and then we've explained everything that needs to be explained. Well I say, more power to him. That's the kind of radical idea that we need to explore if you want to have a purely reductionist brain-based theory of consciousness. At the same time, for me and for many other people, that view is a bit too close to simply denying the datum of consciousness to be satisfactory. So I go in a different direction. In the time remaining, I want to explore two crazy ideas that I think may have some promise. The first crazy idea is that consciousness is fundamental. Physicists sometimes take some aspects of the universe as fundamental building blocks: space and time and mass. They postulate fundamental laws governing them, like the laws of gravity or of quantum mechanics. These fundamental properties and laws aren't explained in terms of anything more basic. Rather, they're taken as primitive, and you build up the world from there. Now sometimes, the list of fundamentals expands. In the 19th century, Maxwell figured out that you can't explain electromagnetic phenomena in terms of the existing fundamentals — space, time, mass, Newton's laws — so he postulated fundamental laws of electromagnetism and postulated electric charge as a fundamental element that those laws govern. I think that's the situation we're in with consciousness. If you can't explain consciousness in terms of the existing fundamentals — space, time, mass, charge — then as a matter of logic, you need to expand the list. The natural thing to do is to postulate consciousness itself as something fundamental, a fundamental building block of nature. This doesn't mean you suddenly can't do science with it. This opens up the way for you to do science with it. What we then need is to study the fundamental laws governing consciousness, the laws that connect consciousness to other fundamentals: space, time, mass, physical processes. Physicists sometimes say that we want fundamental laws so simple that we could write them on the front of a t-shirt. Well I think something like that is the situation we're in with consciousness. We want to find fundamental laws so simple we could write them on the front of a t-shirt. We don't know what those laws are yet, but that's what we're after. The second crazy idea is that consciousness might be universal. Every system might have some degree of consciousness. This view is sometimes called panpsychism: pan for all, psych for mind, every system is conscious, not just humans, dogs, mice, flies, but even Rob Knight's microbes, elementary particles. Even a photon has some degree of consciousness. The idea is not that photons are intelligent or thinking. It's not that a photon is wracked with angst because it's thinking, "Aww, I'm always buzzing around near the speed of light. I never get to slow down and smell the roses." No, not like that. But the thought is maybe photons might have some element of raw, subjective feeling, some primitive precursor to consciousness. A really exciting thing is in recent years a neuroscientist, Giulio Tononi, has taken this kind of theory and developed it rigorously with a mathematical theory. He has a mathematical measure of information integration which he calls phi, measuring the amount of information integrated in a system. And he supposes that phi goes along with consciousness. So in a human brain, incredibly large amount of information integration, high degree of phi, a whole lot of consciousness. In a mouse, medium degree of information integration, still pretty significant, pretty serious amount of consciousness. But as you go down to worms, microbes, particles, the amount of phi falls off. The amount of information integration falls off, but it's still non-zero. On Tononi's theory, there's still going to be a non-zero degree of consciousness. In effect, he's proposing a fundamental law of consciousness: high phi, high consciousness. Now, I don't know if this theory is right, but it's actually perhaps the leading theory right now in the science of consciousness, and it's been used to integrate a whole range of scientific data, and it does have a nice property that it is in fact simple enough you can write it on the front of a t-shirt. This view, I think, the panpsychist view, has the potential to transfigure our relationship to nature, and it may have some pretty serious social and ethical consequences. Some of these may be counterintuitive. I used to think I shouldn't eat anything which is conscious, so therefore I should be vegetarian. Now, if you're a panpsychist and you take that view, you're going to go very hungry. So I think when you think about it, this tends to transfigure your views, whereas what matters for ethical purposes and moral considerations, not so much the fact of consciousness, but the degree and the complexity of consciousness. Okay, so this panpsychist vision, it is a radical one, and I don't know that it's correct. I'm actually more confident about the first crazy idea, that consciousness is fundamental, than about the second one, that it's universal. I mean, the view raises any number of questions, has any number of challenges, like how do those little bits of consciousness add up to the kind of complex consciousness we know and love. If we can answer those questions, then I think we're going to be well on our way to a serious theory of consciousness. If not, well, this is the hardest problem perhaps in science and philosophy. We can't expect to solve it overnight. But I do think we're going to figure it out eventually. Understanding consciousness is a real key, I think, both to understanding the universe and to understanding ourselves. It may just take the right crazy idea. Thank you. 此時此刻 正有一部電影在你腦海中放映,。 這是一部奇妙的多軌道電影。 這部圍繞著你正看到和聽到的電影 擁有三維視覺和環(huán)繞立體聲,, 但這僅僅是個開始,。 你的電影有嗅覺、味覺和觸覺,。 它擁有你的身體所擁有的感覺,, 痛苦,饑餓,,高潮,。 它擁有情緒, 憤怒和快樂,。 它擁有記憶,,就像你的童年 正在你的面前放映,。 并且它在你的有意識的思維流中 擁有恒定的旁白,。 這部電影的核心 是你直接體驗(yàn)這一切。 這部電影是你的意識流,, 它是一部關(guān)于 對思想和世界的體驗(yàn)為主題的影片。 有人說意識科學(xué) 是不可能存在的。 科學(xué),,從它的本質(zhì)上來看,,是客觀的。 意識,,從它的本質(zhì)上來看,,是主觀的,。 所以,不可能會有意識科學(xué),。 在20世紀(jì)的大部分時間里,,這種觀點(diǎn)占據(jù)統(tǒng)治地位。 心理學(xué)家客觀地研究行為舉止,, 神經(jīng)科學(xué)家客觀地研究大腦,, 但是沒有人哪怕是提到意識。 即使30年前,,當(dāng)TED剛開始時,, 也很少見到關(guān)于意識方面 的科學(xué)研究。 大約在20年前,, 所有這些都開始改變了,。 像弗朗西斯·克里克這樣的神經(jīng)科學(xué)家 以及像羅杰·彭羅斯這樣的物理學(xué)家 都說現(xiàn)在正是科學(xué)向意識方面進(jìn)攻 的時候。 從那以來,, 關(guān)于意識方面的科學(xué)研究 遍地開花,。 這項(xiàng)研究很奇妙,很了不起,。 但是迄今為止它也還有一些 根本的局限性,。 近幾年 意識科學(xué)研究的核心 是尋找相關(guān)性, 關(guān)于大腦的特定區(qū)域 和特定的意識狀態(tài)之間的相關(guān)性,。 我們看了南?!た簿S舍 做的一些這方面的研究以及幾分鐘之前 她剛剛提交的精彩工作。 現(xiàn)在我們有了更好的理解,,例如,, 不同的大腦區(qū)域?qū)?yīng)著不同 的意識體驗(yàn):人臉識別 或者感受痛苦 或者感受快樂。 但這仍然是關(guān)于相關(guān)性的科學(xué),。 這不是意識科學(xué),。 我們知道這些大腦區(qū)域 對應(yīng)著特定的意識體驗(yàn), 但是我們不知道為什么會這樣,。 我想說的是,, 神經(jīng)科學(xué)方面的這種研究 正回答著那些 我們想要回答的關(guān)于意識、 關(guān)于某些特定大腦區(qū)域做些什么 以及對應(yīng)哪種(意識體驗(yàn))的問題,。 但是從某種意義上來說,,這些都是簡單的問題。 都不是神經(jīng)科學(xué)家想要研究的,。 沒有真正的關(guān)于意識的簡單問題,。 它沒能解開關(guān)于這個課題的核心 的真正謎團(tuán): 為什么大腦中所有的物理過程 必須伴隨著意識,? 為什么會有這種內(nèi)心的主觀電影的存在,? 目前為止,,我們對此還沒有一點(diǎn)頭緒。 也許你會說,, 讓我們再給神經(jīng)科學(xué)幾年時間,。 它會被證明是另一種涌現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象, 就像塞車,、就像颶風(fēng),、 就像生命一樣,并且我們會弄明白它,。 所有涌現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象的經(jīng)典案例 都是應(yīng)急行為的表現(xiàn),, 塞車是如何行成的, 颶風(fēng)是如何作用的,, 生物體是如何繁殖,、 適應(yīng)環(huán)境和新陳代謝的, 所有這些問題都是關(guān)于客觀機(jī)能的,。 你可以把它應(yīng)用到人類的大腦上 去解釋為什么人類大腦的某些行為 和功能 跟涌現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象很像: 我們?nèi)绾巫呗?,如何談話,如何下象棋?/a> 所有這些問題都是關(guān)于行為的,。 但是當(dāng)談到意識時,, 關(guān)于行為的問題 只是一個簡單的問題。 當(dāng)涉及到困難問題時,, 問題就變成了為什么 所有的這些行為 都伴隨著主觀體驗(yàn),。 對此,涌現(xiàn)現(xiàn)象 的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)范例,, 甚至神經(jīng)科學(xué)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)范例,, 到目前為止都沒有太多可以說的。 現(xiàn)在,,我本質(zhì)上是一個科學(xué)唯物主義者,。 我希望某種關(guān)于意識的科學(xué)理論 能夠奏效, 在過去很長一段時間里,, 我埋頭苦干,, 努力尋找一種有效的 單從物理的角度去解釋的 關(guān)于意識的理論。 但我最終得出一個結(jié)論,, 那就是它不起作用只是因?yàn)橄到y(tǒng)性的原因,。 說來話長, 但是這個故事的核心就是 你從在物理方面,,在基于大腦方面的 純粹的還原論者的解釋中得到的東西,, 是關(guān)于一個系統(tǒng)的功能、 它的結(jié)構(gòu),、它的動力,、 以及它所產(chǎn)生的行為的,, 它可以很好地解決簡單問題—— 比如說我們?nèi)绾伪憩F(xiàn),我們?nèi)绾位顒印?/a> 但是當(dāng)它涉及到主觀體驗(yàn)時—— 比如說為什么所有這些都感覺像是來自內(nèi)心的某些東西,?—— 這是一些全新的東西,, 并且它總會成為一個更深層次的問題。 因此我想我們進(jìn)入了僵局,。 我們已經(jīng)有了一套美妙的,、偉大的解釋鏈, 我們已經(jīng)習(xí)慣了它,,那就是用用物理解釋化學(xué),, 用化學(xué)解釋生物, 用生物解釋部分心理學(xué),。 但是意識 似乎并不符合這種情形,。 一方面,它是一個已知數(shù) 即我們是有意識的,。 另一方面,,我們卻并不知道 如何使它與我們的科學(xué)的世界觀相適應(yīng)。 所以我認(rèn)為就目前而言意識 是一種反常事物,, 是一種需要我們將它整合到 我們的世界觀中,,而我們卻還不知道如何整合的事物。 面對這樣的反常事物,, 我們可能需要一些激進(jìn)的想法,, 并且我認(rèn)為我們可能需要一兩個 在我們可以科學(xué)地 面對意識之前 看起來很瘋狂的想法。 現(xiàn)在,,對于這些瘋狂的想法可能是什么 已經(jīng)有了一些候選項(xiàng),。 我的朋友丹·丹尼特就有一個這樣的想法,他今天也在這里,。 他的瘋狂想法是關(guān)于意識 的困難問題并不存在,。 整個內(nèi)心主觀電影的想法 涉及一種幻覺或困惑。 事實(shí)上,,我們現(xiàn)在要做的就是解釋 客觀功能和大腦行為,, 然后自然地我們就解釋了 所有需要被解釋的。 我想說,,給他更多的能量,。 這就是那種我們需要去探索的 激進(jìn)想法, 如果你想獲得關(guān)于意識的 純還原論者的基于大腦的理論的話,。 同時,,對于我和其他很多人來說, 這個觀點(diǎn)有一點(diǎn)太接近于簡單地 否認(rèn)關(guān)于意識的已知資料 而不能令人滿意。 因此我選擇了另一個不同的方向,。 在余下的時間里,, 我想探討兩個我認(rèn)為可能有希望的 瘋狂想法,。 第一種瘋狂想法是 意識是一種基本概念,。 物理學(xué)家有時候會把宇宙中的某些方面 作為基本概念,,如: 空間,、時間和質(zhì)量。 他們設(shè)定了一些基本定律去管理它們,, 例如重力定律和量子力學(xué)定律,。 這些基本性質(zhì)和定律 不能解釋一些更基礎(chǔ)的東西。 這相當(dāng)于以它們?yōu)楦荆?/a> 然后你在它們的基礎(chǔ)上建立這個世界,。 現(xiàn)在,,這張基本定律名單會不時擴(kuò)大。 在19世紀(jì),,麥克斯韋斷定 你無法用當(dāng)時存在的基本概念—— 空間,、時間、質(zhì)量,、牛頓定律—— 去解釋電磁現(xiàn)象,, 因此他設(shè)定了電磁學(xué)的 基本定律, 并且設(shè)定了電荷 作為這些定律的 基本元素,。 我認(rèn)為這與我們在研究意識上的 情形是一樣的,。 如果我們不能用現(xiàn)存的基本概念—— 時間、空間,、質(zhì)量,、電荷—— 去解釋意識, 那么從邏輯上而言,,你需要去擴(kuò)充這張名單。 接下來將意識本身設(shè)定為 某種根本性的東西,, 作為自然界的基本概念就是一件自然而然的事。 這并不意味著突然間你不能用它來研究科學(xué)了,。 這反而是為你開僻了一條用它來研究科學(xué)的道路,。 然后我們需要做的就是研究 那些掌控著意識的基本定律, 那些將意識與其它基本概念—— 空間,、時間,、質(zhì)量、物理過程—— 聯(lián)系在一起的定律,。 物理學(xué)家有時候說 我們希望那些基本定律可以簡單到 能夠把它們寫在T恤上,。 我想我們在對意識的研究上 也應(yīng)該這樣,。 我希望我們發(fā)現(xiàn)的關(guān)于意識的基本定律也可以簡單到 能夠把它們寫在T恤上。 我們現(xiàn)在還不知道這些定律是什么,, 但這是我們正在尋找的,。 第二個瘋狂的想法 是意識也許是普通存在的。 也許每個系統(tǒng)都有某種程度的 意識,。 這種觀點(diǎn)有時被稱作泛心論: 萬物皆有精神或心理活動,, 每個系統(tǒng)都具有意識, 不僅是人類、狗、老鼠,、蒼蠅,, 甚至連羅伯·奈特的微生物,、 基本粒子都具有意識,。 甚至連一個光子都有某種程度的意識。 這個觀點(diǎn)不是說光子是智能的 或者能思考的。 不是說一個光子 會由于焦慮而被破壞, 而這種焦慮是因?yàn)樗胫芭叮铱偸且越咏馑俚乃俣?/a> 緊張地跑來跑去,,從來沒有放慢速度來聞一聞玫瑰花香“,。 不,事情不是這樣子的,。 這種觀點(diǎn)想要表達(dá)的是也許光子可能會有 一些原始的,、主觀的體驗(yàn),, 一些原始的意識的前兆,。 對你來說,這聽起來可能有點(diǎn)怪,。 我的意思是,,為什么不可以有人思考這樣瘋狂的事呢? 有一些動機(jī)來自第一個瘋狂想法,, 即意識是基本概念,。 如果它是基本概念,,就像空間,、時間和質(zhì)量一樣, 那么很自然地可以假定它也可能具有普遍性,, 就像其它的基本概念一樣,。 還有一點(diǎn)值得注意的是雖然這個想法 對我們來說是違反直覺的,, 但對來自其他文化的人來說 可能就不是那么違反直覺了, 那些(其他文化的)人的心靈 跟自然聯(lián)系在一起的時間更長,。 一件令人很興奮的事是最近幾年 有一個神經(jīng)科學(xué)家,朱利奧·托諾尼 采用了這種理論 并且嚴(yán)格按照數(shù)學(xué)理論 的方式發(fā)展了它,。 他有一個關(guān)于信息整合 的數(shù)學(xué)測量,, 他稱之為phi,, 他用它來測量 一個系統(tǒng)中的信息整合的量,。 他推斷phi 是與意識相關(guān)的,。 所以在人類的大腦中,, 有著令人難以置信的信息整合量,, 高度的phi值,, 一大堆的意識。 在老鼠的大腦中,,有中度的信息整合量,, 但仍然數(shù)目龐大, 仍然具有大量的意識。 但是當(dāng)你將研究目標(biāo)降至蠕蟲、 微生物,、粒子,, phi的值就會跌落,。 信息整合量會跌落,, 但不會為零。 在托諾尼的理論中,, 意識程度 也不會降為零,。 事實(shí)上,他正在提出這樣一個關(guān)于意識的 基本定律:phi值越高,,意識度也越高,。 現(xiàn)在,我不知道這個理論是否正確,, 但是實(shí)際上或許它正處于 意識科學(xué)的理論前沿,, 并且它已經(jīng)被用于整合 各方面的科學(xué)數(shù)據(jù), 它還有一個很好的屬性就是它足夠簡單,, 簡單到你可以將它寫在T恤上,。 另外一個最終動機(jī)就是 泛心論可以幫助我們 將意識和物理世界相結(jié)合。 物理學(xué)家和哲學(xué)家經(jīng)常注意到 物理學(xué)是深奧抽象的,。 它用一連串的方程式 去描述現(xiàn)實(shí)結(jié)構(gòu),, 但是它又不告訴我們 構(gòu)成它的現(xiàn)實(shí)基礎(chǔ)。 正如史蒂芬·霍金所說,, 是什么將火放進(jìn)方程式的,? 而在泛心論者看來, 物理方程可以是它現(xiàn)在的樣子,, 但是你也可以用它來描述 意識的量,。 這是物理學(xué)最終要做的, 描述意識的量。 用這種觀點(diǎn)看來,,是意識 將火放到了方程中,。 在那種觀點(diǎn)看來,意識 不是晃蕩在物質(zhì)世界之外 的特別的東西,。 它存在于物質(zhì)世界的核心,。 好了,,這就是泛心論者的觀點(diǎn),, 它是一個激進(jìn)的想法, 而我不知道它是否正確,。 事實(shí)上我對第一個瘋狂想法 即意識是一種基本概念,, 要比對第二個瘋狂想法 即意識是普遍存在的 要更有把握。 我的意思是,,這個觀點(diǎn)引起了很多問題,, 擁有很多挑戰(zhàn), 比如說那些小的意識 是如何添加到 我們了解和喜愛 的復(fù)雜意識中去的,。 如果我們能夠回答這些問題,, 那么我想我們就會在通往 關(guān)于意識的嚴(yán)肅理論的道路上順利走下去。 如果不能,,那么這可能成為 科學(xué)上和哲學(xué)上最難解的問題,。 我們不能期盼一個晚上就能解決這個問題。 但是我相信我們終將弄明白它,。 我想,,理解意識是 我們理解宇宙 和理解我們自己的一個關(guān)鍵。 而做到這一點(diǎn)也許只需要我們采用正確的瘋狂想法,。
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